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to establish the legislative intent by reasoning from an analogous statute.
It might better have relied on a similar Indiana statute protecting pedestrians
than on a repealed Michigan statute.1 3
A possible solution would be the construction of all highway statutes of
the state in pari materia, and from an examination of the entire body of law
on this subject determine the highway statutes to be enacted to eliminate all
types of serious highway hazards. The court did not expressly assume this
position, but the use of the Michigan statute to determine the class of persons
protected by a statute is consistent only with this approach to the problem.' 4
B. W.
TRUSTS-APPORTIONMENT OF INCOME BETWEEN LIFE BENEFICIARY AND
REMAINDERMAN.-The testator created nine separate trusts, one for each of
eight relatives and the ninth to be known as the "Doctor E. G. Long Founda-
tion." The net income of each of the separate trusts (other than the founda-
tion) was to be paid to the respective beneficiaries for lifel and on their
deaths the principals were to be turned over to the foundation. On the death
of one of the life beneficiaries a controversy arose as to who was entitled to
the income accumulated, earned, and accrued, but undistributed at the date
of the life beneficiary's death. The lower court held that all the income ac-
cumulated, earned, and accrued but undistributed should be apportioned as
of the date of death and paid to her sole heir at law. On appeal, the judg-
ment was affirmed. St. Mary's Hospital of Evansville, Indiana v. Louis E.
Long (Ind. 1938), 17 N. E. (2d) 833.
On the death of a life beneficiary of a trust, a difficult problem as to the
apportionment of income therefrom between the life beneficiary and the re-
mainderman is presented. This is especially true when the trustee is in pos-
session of rents, dividends, annuities, and interest monies which have accrued
both before and after the termination of the life interest.
It is an elementary principle that the rights of the life tenant and the
remainderman depend upon the intention of the testator which is to be gathered
from the terms of the trust instrument taken as a whole and in the light
of all the surrounding circumstances.2  When such a rule of construction
ia See Burns' Ind. Stat. (1933), §47-513; Baldwin's Ind. St. 1934, §11166,
which is substantially the same statute as the Michigan statute. See Mich.
Comp. Laws 1929, Sec. 4696. Note that both the repealed Michigan statute
and the Indiana statute referred to pedestrians on the traveled portion of
the highway. See Fishman v. Eads (1929), 90 Ind. App. 137, 168 N. E. 495
allowing recovery to a pedestrian injured by the violation of this statute.
14 The statement is frequently found in Indiana decisions involving high-
way statutes that the statute is for "the protection of persons and property
lawfully upon the public highways of this state." See the instant case, also
Koplovitz v. Jensen (1925), 197 Ind. 475, 151 N. E. 390.
1 In the present case the life beneficiaries were to receive the income im-
mediately after receipt thereof by the trustee, but in order to make a uniform
time for payment and accounting, the life beneficiaries agreed with the trustee
to be paid quarterly. (See footnote 13 for further information on this point).
2Eustace v. Dickey (1921), 240 Mass. 55, 132 N. E. 852; Restatement,
Trusts (1935), § 235, comment f. "By the terms of the trust it may be pro-
vided that income otherwise apportionable shall not be apportioned or that
income otherwise not apportionable shall be apportioned."
RECENT CASE NOTES
is used and the testator has clearly manifested his intent as to the method of
apportionment, the courts have had little difficulty, the only problems arising
when the trust instrument is-silent or indefinite upon the subject of apportion-
ment.
In determining whether or not trust income is apportionable or non-
apportionable when the trust instrument is silent as to the method of appor-
tionment, the courts have been greatly influenced by the type of income in-
volved. These determining factors have been classified as periodic income3
and income that accrues from day to day.4
Periodic income has been defined as that income which is payable at
fixed times or periods, 5 the most important kinds being rents, 6 annuities, 7
pensions, 8 and dividends.9 In the absence of statutes or express directions
in the trust instrument such income is not apportionable during the intervening
periods,' 0 the reason being that it accrues in a lump sum when due and not
gradually day by day."t However, if such income should become due and
payable before the termination of the life interest it goes to the life benefici-
ary estate.1 2
On the other hand, the courts have consistently held that income accruing
day by day is apportionable.13 In holding thus the courts have formulated
3 William L. Dexter v. John C. Phillips (1826), 121 Mass. 178, 23 Am.
Rep. 261; Bogert, Handbook on Trusts, pp. 388-389.
4 Wilmington Trust Co. v. Chapman (1934), 20 Del. Ch. 67, 171 A. 222.
5 Bogert, Handbook on Trusts, pp. 388-389.
665 C. J. 690, § 556; Dexter v. Phillips (1876), 121 Mass. 178, 23 Am.
Rep. 261.
7 Chase v. Darby (1896), 110 Mich. 314, 68 N. W. 159. "The only excep-
tion to this rule is where the annuitant is a feme covert, or an infant and
the annuity is intended for the daily maintenance of the annuitant."8 Bogert, Handbook on Trusts, p. 389. Wilson's Appeal (1885), 108 Pa.
344, 56 Am. Rep. 214.
9 Greene v. Huntington (1900), 73 Conn. 106, 46 A. 883. In the case of
dividends a more difficult question is presented, since the dividends may be
in stock or cash. In this regard the courts have applied three principles
which are commonly termed the Kentucky, the Massachusetts, and the Pennsyl-
vania rules. The Pennsylvania rule, which is the one adhered to by the
majority of the states, is that the dividends of earnings made after the set-
tlor's death are income and are payable to the life beneficiary no matter
whether the dividends be in cash, script, or stock. Bogert, Handbook on
Trusts, pp. 379-384.
10 Dexter v. Phillips (1876), 121 Mass. 178, 23 Am. Rep. 261. However,
many states have remedied this situation by passing statutes allowing such
apportionment. Practically all states have passed laws allowing rents to be
apportioned, 1933 Burns' Ind. Stat. §3-1630, and several states have passed
similar statutes concerning annuities, Rev. Laws Mass. (1902), c. 141, Sec. 25;
and dividends, Code Civ. Proc. N. Y. sec. 2674.
11 Bogert, Handbook on Trusts, pp. 388-389.
121Hayword v. Blake (1924), 247 Mass. 430, 142 N. E. 52; Rhode Island
Hasp. Co. v. Pecham (1919), 42 R. I. 365, 107 A. 209; Bogert, Handbook on
Trusts, p. 380.
13 Restatement, Trusts (1935), § 235; Bogert, Handbook on Trusts, pp.
389-392. This includes the following types of interest: on coupon bonds,
Bridgeport Trust Co. v. Marsh (1913), 87 Conn. 304, 87 A. 865; on mortgages,
Hayword v. Blake (1924), 247 Mass. 430, 142 N. E. 52; on promissory notes
of individuals or companies, Dexter v. Phillips (1876), 121 Mass. 178. And
the fact that the income is payable quarterly or at some other period
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certain principles, the first being that if the income has accrued and been
collected before the termination of the life interest, it clearly belongs to the
life beneficiary's estate.1 4  Secondly, if the income accrues both prior to
and after the death of the life beneficiary, equity will apportion that accruing
prior to the life beneficiary's death to his estate and that accruing thereafter
to the remainderman. 1 5 Third, if the income has accrued prior to the life
beneficiary's death but is uncollected, the income belongs to the estate of the
life tenant.10 And finally, if the income accrues after the termination of the
life interest the courts have uniformly held that the income thus accumulated
goes to the remainderman.
In the present case nothing was mentioned as to the type of income in-
volved, but it was intimated that it was interest. If true, then according to
the rules enunciated above all that income which had been accumulated, earned,
and accrued, but undistributed before the death of the life beneficiary be-
longed to his estate and all which accrued after his death to the remainder-
man. However, the dictum in the case to the effect that the character of the
investment would have no controlling effect on the disposition of the income
is at odds with many decisions of the courts. This is proved by the fact that
the courts in determining whether or not income is apportionable or non-
apportionable have considered as the controlling factor the character of the
investment made. The actual holding, however, accords with the established
principles and the clear weight of authority. F. L. M.
will not deprive the life beneficiary's estate of the accrued income if he dies
within the quarter or other period since the normal intention of the testator
is that he should have the income as fast as it is accumulated and as long as
he lives. Leverett v. Barnwell (1913), 214 Mass. 105, 101 N. E. 75; Stone
v. Bradle (1903), 183 Mass. 165, 66 N. E. 708. However, the settlor may
make the survival until the payment date a condition precedent to the acquisi-
tion of any rights by the life tenant. Lynder v. Heffner (1929), 33 Ohio A.
379, 169 N. E. 460.
14 Restatement, Trusts (1935), §235; Stone v. Bradle (1903), 183 Mass.
165, 66 N. E. 708.
15 Commercial Trust Co. of New Jersey v. Spiegelberg (1934), 117 N.
J. Eq. 171, 175 A. 164.
16 Restatement, Trusts (1935), § 235; Union Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v.
Dudley (1908), 104 Me. 297, 72 A. 166.
17 In re Watson's Will (1933), 262 N. Y. 284, 186 N. E. 787; Barbour
et al, Trustees v. Gallagher (1913), 2 Ohio A. 205.
18 The phrase "character of investment" is used here to designate the type
of income producing property in which the trust funds are invested, for
example, bonds, stocks, etc.
